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Abstract
The 1957 Harvard encounter between Paul Tillich and Zen master Shin’ichi Hisamatsu 
contains a wealth of  information on the overlap and discrepancies between the two 
systems of  thought, both individually and in regard to the larger East-West dialogue. 
This paper was written with the intent to mine the somewhat chaotic content of  this 
historical document for elements leading to a systematic philosophical and theological 
investigation of  underlying themes. In particular, it takes into account insights from 
Tillich’s early German period to highlight the profound difference in his approach to 
the notion of  paradox when compared to that of  Zen Buddhism, a tradition he admired 
but was never fully able to penetrate.
Keywords: Tillich, Hisamatsu, East-West dialogue, Tillich’s German period, Zen Bu-
ddhism.
Guia para os perplexos: uma tentativa de dar sentido 
aos diálogos entre Tillich e Hisamatusu
Resumo 
O encontro de Harvard em 1957 entre Paul Tillich e o mestre Zen Shin’ichi Hisamatsu 
contém uma grande riqueza de informações a respeito de coincidências e discrepâncias 
entre os dois sistemas de pensamento, individualmente e em relação com o amplo diálogo 
Oriente-Ocidente. Este artigo foi escrito na intenção de explorar o conteúdo um tanto 
caótico deste documento histórico à procura de elementos suscetíveis de levar a uma pes-
quisa sistemática filosófica e teológica dos temas subjacentes. Em particular, ele considera 
ideias do início do período germânico de Tillich, para esclarecer a profunda diferença na 
sua abordagem da noção de paradoxo em relação com a abordagem do budismo Zen, 
uma tradição que Tillich admirava, mas nunca foi plenamente capaz de penetrar. 
Palavras-chave: Tillich, Hisamatsu, diálogo Oriente-Ocidente, período alemão de 
Tillich, budismo Zen. 
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Guía para el perplejo: un intento de dar sentido a los diálo-
gos entre Tillich y Hisamatusu
Resumén 
La reunión de Harvard en 1957 entre Paul Tillich y el Zen master Shin ‘ ichi Hisamat-
su contiene una riqueza de información sobre coincidencias y discrepancias entre los 
dos sistemas de pensamiento, tanto individualmente como en relación con el amplio 
diálogo East-West. Este artículo fue escrito con el fin de explorar el contenido algo 
caótico de este documento histórico en busca de elementos susceptibles de dar lugar a 
una investigación filosófica y teológica sistemática de temas subyacentes. En particular, 
considera las ideas germánicas tempranas de Tillich, para aclarar la profunda diferencia 
en su acercamiento a la noción de paradoja en relación con el enfoque del budismo Zen, 
una tradición que Tillich admiraba, pero nunca fue completamente capaz de penetrar.
Palabras-claves: Tillich, Hisamatsu, East-West, período alemán de Tillich, budismo Zen.
Introduction
Direct contact has a unique way of  clarifying things, though often in a 
painful way – notably in the dialogue between cultures and religions. Among 
the major 20th century Christian theologians, Paul Tillich is probably the one 
who has most consistently shown appreciation for the world’s religious tradi-
tions, including Buddhism, but it is only towards the end of  his life that he 
had the opportunity to establish that direct contact through meetings with 
representatives of  Japanese Zen. 
Judging from the main available documents on this encounter, in the 
three 1957 dialogues with Zen master Shin’ichi Hisamatsu1, the reality of  
Zen must have hit Tillich’s inquisitive mind somewhat in the same way as 
“being” confronts “thinking,” like an unmovable wall, in Tillich’s own phi-
losophy of  religion. To Tillich’s considerable credit, he did not in any way 
seek to remove the obstacle by rationalizing the existence of  differences and 
disagreements. These differences, we will see, are as significant as the very 
real elective affinities between the Christian thinker who said that God “does 
not exist” and the Zen tradition that emphasizes nothingness. 
The 1957 dialogues are thus not a case of  generic confrontation between 
Christianity and Buddhism, but the meeting between the personal vision of  
Tillich’s religious philosophy and the Zen Buddhism of  20th century Japan. 
Considered by commentators as a rather inconclusive, even clumsy attempt 
to bridge the big gap between East and West, these dialogues are actually 
1  Henceforth referred to as Dialogues. 
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revealing of  the reasons that limit the extent of  the family resemblance 
between the two sides. 
A. Tillich and Buddhism
1) The starting point 
Since Tillich had been discussing Buddhism in the context of  his typo-
logy of  religions since the early 1920s, it will be useful to start there in order 
to create the proper setting for an evaluation of  the 1957 meetings. Tillich’s 
position at that time (a position that would remain largely unchanged) is best 
expressed toward the end of  his 1920 Berlin lecture (Berliner Vorlesung) on 
the philosophy of  religion.
Buddhism is non-speculative. … Its goal is immersion. Immersion into what, 
one might ask. The common philosophy of  religion finds itself  confronted 
by an enigma here, because it has never been able to detach itself  from the 
speculative form of  philosophy of  religion. A God who is not hypostasized 
does not seem to be religious. The immersion of  Buddhism, however, is 
immersion into pure substance (Tillich, 2000, p. 555-556)2. 
Tillich’s last sentence here raises the decisive issue of  the entire debate 
about the similarity and difference between Buddhism and Western theism, 
notably Christianity. For him, Western religious thought’s original sin is to 
have succumbed to the temptation of  objectifying God, making him into a 
Being, no matter how lofty and special, and speculating about his (its) nature. 
Buddhism, with its refusal of  metaphysics and its negation of  anything that 
could be identified as “god,” offers a powerful alternative in his eyes.3 And 
that alternative is not an empty one, since the substance, the Gehalt, remains 
intact in its purest form4. Whether that is really the case may largely depend 
2 “Der Buddhismus ist unspekulativ… Sein Ziel ist ja Versenkung. Versenkung in was? könnte man 
fragen. Die übliche Religionsphilosophie steht hier vor einem Rätsel, weil sie nie losgekommen ist von er 
spekulativen Religionsphilosophie. Ein nicht hypostasierter Gott scheint nicht religiös zu sein. Nun ist 
aber die buddhistische Versenkung Versenkung in den reinen Gehalt”. Our translation throughout. 
3 Here, we will not be entering the complex question of  how real the “atheism” of  Bu-
ddhism is in view of  the great variety of  developments since its early beginnings. Tillich’s 
understanding certainly applies to Zen Buddhism, which will be mainly discussed here. 
4 It is to be noted that Tillich makes a clear distinction between Inhalt (content) and Gehalt. 
The latter is often translated as “substance”, even though this German expression is as 
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on one’s definition and perception of  substance. It has, in any case, been at 
the center of  the debate on the positive or negative nature of  the Buddhist 
notion of  emptiness, nothingness or śūnyatā and its relationship to the Wes-
tern notions of  being and non-being.
2) The debate
In his discussion of  the experiential dimension of  religion, Ninian Smart 
criticizes Rudolf  Otto for conflating his famous notion of  the numinous with 
that of  mystical experience (Smart and Konstantine, 1991, p. 69). Smart’s 
distinction between the two represents one of  that author’s own trademarks: 
the numinous is the divine experienced as an external Being that confronts 
us in its majesty, mysterious and both terrifying and attractive (mysterium tre-
mendum et fascinans); a mystical experience is one where the divine is perceived 
within, without any specific form or identity, and where the mind meets 
the void through “consciousness-emptying.” That second form of  religious 
experience applies both to Buddhism and medieval Christian mysticism, e.g., 
that of  Meister Eckhart, the favorite Western reference for Zen Buddhists. 
However, Otto insists that the notion of  void or emptiness in Buddhist 
spirituality (and in the via negativa of  middle age’s mystical theology, though 
in a slightly different form) in fact accounts for the fullness of  being on the 
level of  experience. Non-being, for Otto, is then merely an ideogram used to 
describe the indescribable “wholly other” (Otto, 1926, p. 38). Thus, for him, 
there is identity between the core of  being, the numinous, and non-being, 
because both symbolically express what cannot be adequately explained in 
rational language. Non-being is a negation of  the rational concept of  being, 
not the negation of  its Gehalt: “The nonbeing of  negative theology means 
‘not being anything special,’ being beyond every concrete predicate. This 
nonbeing embraces everything; it means being everything; it is Being itself. 
The dialectical question of  nonbeing was and is a problem of  affirmative 
theology” (Tillich, 1951, p. 188-189).
impossible to adequately translate as the similar Gestalt. Both the more common Inhalt 
and Gehalt imply something that is included, or “held” within (-halt). Inhalt or content, 
however, is what is simply used to fill a pre-existing form that determines it, just as 
the Aristotelian matter is determined by form. Gehalt, on the contrary, implies that the 
content is the real substance that gives its being to the form – a form that can never be 
fully adequate in expressing it. There is thus a reversal of  priority between the two. For 
Tillich, Gehalt represents the non-rational being of  all things (the quality of  just being 
there), which forms the counterpart to their rational form.
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Keiji Nishitani speaks in similar terms: “The standpoint of  śūnyatā … 
is not a standpoint of  simply negative negativity … It is the standpoint at 
which absolute negation is at the same time … a Great Affirmation” (Nishi-
tani, 1982, p. 138). That is also very much the point of  Shin’ichi Hisamatsu 
in his 1957 dialogues with Tillich, as we will discover. On the other hand, as 
Yoshinori Takeuchi puts it, in the discussion on being and non-being, Western 
philosophers and theologians regularly align themselves on the side of  being, 
which plays a pivotal role in Western civilization. In Buddhism, the central 
notion is the idea of  “nothingness” (Takeuchi, 1980, p. 1).  
3) Non-being in the Western tradition
Thus, the tradition of  Western thought strongly emphasizes being over 
non-being. But the latter, with its mysterious appeal, the questions it raises, 
and the aporia it often leads to in thought systems, has generated enough 
writing to fill volumes. The discussion starts with Parmenides’ famous denial 
of  motion that would imply non-being or the negation of  being, which is 
everything. In his dialogue Parmenides, Plato presents a meticulous analysis of  
the question of  ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ or ‘not-being’ and how they exclude 
each other (Plato, 1970, p. 195-197).
Later, when discussing creatio ex nihilo in is Monologion, St. Anselm, felt 
forced to clarify that nothing meant “not anything” and not some substance 
called nothing (Anselm of  Canterbury, 1974, p. 16-17). Tillich himself  has 
tried to revive the Ancient Greek distinction between absolute non-being, ouk 
on (οὐκ ὤν) and me on (μὴ ὤν), the non-being that has the potential for 
dialectical interaction with being. Thus, though being is the central focus of  
Western thought, non-being has literally been following it like a shadow. The 
reasons, from the Zen perspective, are obvious: being is not the Ultimate; it 
is a conceptual formulation of  it and it automatically calls for its opposite, 
a process that can never be resolved on that level of  rational thinking. 
If  we now turn to the Tillich-Hisamatsu dialogues, one critical point 
appears immediately: for Tillich, God is qualified as esse ipsum (Tillich, 1951, 
p. 234 ff., passim). For Buddhism, on the other hand, and particularly for 
Hisamatsu’s Zen, the realm of  genuine reality is beyond being and non-being. 
Thus, what is the ultimate for one of  the two thinkers (Tillich) is something 
to be overcome for the other (Hisamatsu), or so it seems. 
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B. Direct encounter: The Tillich-Hisamatsu dialogues
1) The seTTing
Dr. Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, a lay Zen scholar and disciple of  Kitaro Nishi-
da, had spent the year 1957 as a visiting professor at Harvard. His lectures 
focused on his recently released book on Zen and the Fine Arts, which 
explains why the conversations he would have with his Western colleagues 
involved many exchanges about the meaning of  art. On his way back to 
his home country in 1958, Hisamatsu would also visit Carl-Gustav Jung in 
Switzerland, near Zurich (Wirth, 2006, pp. 35-41) and Martin Heidegger in 
Freiburg, Germany (Copley, 1963)5. 
The points of  contact and similarities between the thought of  Paul 
Tillich and Zen Buddhism are obvious and well-known, notably Tillich’s 
ubiquitous use of  the notion of  paradox, but also his contention that nega-
ting the existence of  God is essential to religiousness, rather than a sign of  
impiety – a paradox in itself.6 Furthermore, following his predecessors, the 
philosophers of  religion Rudolf  Otto and Ernst Troeltsch, Tillich has always 
maintained an open approach towards the world’s religions, in stark contrast 
to Karl Barth and many of  the 20th century’s major theologians. In his latter 
years, he has particularly developed the dialogue with Eastern religions, ack-
nowledging an affinity with the approach of  Zen Buddhism, notably in one 
of  his famous 1961 Bampton Lectures at Columbia University (Tillich, 1963)7. 
Tillich’s contribution to the dialogue between East and West has been 
acknowledged on both sides of  the divide. His name is mentioned in just 
about every publication on the topic, and his work has been used as a prime 
example for a possible interface between the two approaches. On the Eastern 
side, this includes Kee Chong Ryu’s Nāgārjuna’s Emptiness and Paul Tillich’s 
5  The Hisamatsu-Heidegger discussion revolved specifically around the question of  art. 
According to Jason Wirth, Hisamatsu received nothing but praise from Heidegger.
6  For an in-depth exploration of  this questions, refer to: Robert R. N. Ross, The Non-
-Existence of  God. Linguistic Paradox in Tillich’s Thought.
7  There have been numerous other meetings between Tillich and representatives 
of  Japan’s religions and philosophy, both in the USA and in Japan. An example 
are the transcripts from recordings of  two 1960 conversations Tillich had with 
Buddhist and Christian representatives in Japan, published by Robert W. Wood in 
Japanese Religions. See also Tillich’s account of  a visit to Japan in Hannah Tillich’s 
second autobiographical publication, From Place to Place. Travels With Paul Tillich, 
Travels Without Paul Tillich.
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God (Ryu, 1985) and Yoshinori Takeuchi’s 1959 Festschrift in honor of  Tillich 
(Takeuchi, 1959, pp. 291-365).
2) elecTive affiniTies and family resemblance
The 1957 dialogues offer a good display of  the already mentioned 
similarities and affinities between Tillich and Hisamatsu’s Zen. In fact, they 
show that there are striking similarities between the two. These similarities 
are due to the fact that both have grappled with the same difficulties found 
in more traditional ways of  thinking – be it Christianity or Buddhism. Before 
turning to the equally significant differences, I will offer a brief  survey of  
the main points of  contact or even agreement8. 
 
a) The raTional discourse: insufficienT buT inescapable
For both, the rational discourse is fundamentally unable to grasp the 
nature of  reality, yet it cannot be discarded either. As Hisamatsu puts it, the 
“ultimate antinomy” or dichotomy between the positive and the negative, 
good and evil, needs to be solved at its root, something that cannot be done 
through cognitive learning, morality, or art. But he immediately adds: “Still, 
to solve this problem that reason cannot solve, there must be a solution that 
will nevertheless satisfy reason (Dialogues, p. 119)”. The desperate attempts 
by Hisamatsu and his translators to convey to Tillich the meaning of  their 
religious philosophy through words, rather than through non-verbal ways, is 
symptomatic of  that intent – and its challenges.
Tillich summarizes his own views at the beginning of  the first encounter 
by saying that words are deceptive, but inevitable – they are “the only things 
which communicate (Stambaugh, 1999, p. 81).” In 1922 already, Tillich had 
stated that “’Religion’ is the concept of  a reality which through this very 
concept is destroyed. Yet the concept is unavoidable” and religion “can do 
nothing other than work with … concepts” (Tillich, 1969, p. 139). 
b) religion and philosophy: philosophy of religion 
Here also, there is a similarity of  views. For Tillich, “If  a reunion of  
theology and philosophy is ever to be possible it will be achieved only in a 
8 No attempt will be made here to summarize the content of  the three loosely structured 
dialogues and their many recurrent themes. For a good overview, see Joan Stambaugh’s 
The Formless Self.
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synthesis that does justice to this experience of  the abyss in our lives [reve-
aled by WW I]. My philosophy of  religion has attempted to meet this need. 
It consciously remains on the boundary between theology and philosophy, 
taking care not to lose the one in the other. It attempts to express the experience 
of  abyss in philosophical concepts… [emphasis added]” (Tillich, 1966, p. 52). 
In his conversation with Carl-Gustav Jung, who warned him that he 
(Jung) was a psychologist, and not a philosopher, Hisamatsu responds: “In 
a sense, one might say that Zen is a philosophy, but it is very different from 
ordinary philosophy, which depends on human intellectual activity. One might 
therefore say that Zen is no philosophy. Zen is a philosophy and at the same 
time a religion, but no ordinary religion. It is ‘religion and philosophy’” (Jung 
and Hisamatsu, 2002, p 112). 
c) WhaT is religion?
The overall question, “what is religion?” for the two thinkers is too far-
-reaching to be dealt with here, though a collection of  Tillich’s early essays 
in English has appeared under that very title. One can nevertheless briefly 
note that both Hisamatsu and Tillich similarly seek the validity of  religion 
not in the assumed truth of  its dogma, but in the demonstration that it is a 
necessary function of  the human mind, separate from all other aspects, yet 
related to them. Hisamatsu speaks of  religion’s “objective validity” that should 
be different from that of  science, art and morality. Tillich says as much when 
he affirms that religion is the most fundamental constitutive function of  
human consciousness, but at the same time should not be considered apart 
from the other functions (Tillich, 2000, pp. 338, 345-346, passim).
d) The sacred and The profane
Hisamatsu’s Zen and Tillich’s religious philosophy both stand in contrast 
to the sacred-profane dichotomy proper to most religious traditions (inclu-
ding much of  Buddhism) and discussed by authors like Rudolf  Otto and 
Mircea Eliade. In his lengthy explanations on Zen art, Hisamatsu explains 
that, unlike other forms of  Buddhism, Zen does not focus on the formal 
or cultish elements of  sacred motifs. Rather, Zen art finds its material in 
“what ordinarily would be considered most insignificant – or, indeed, pro-
fane” (Dialogues, p. 133). At the same time, along with Tillich, he deplores 
the secularization of  Japanese art that began with the Tokugawa dynasty 
(1603-1868). Secularization, here, means a secularization of  attitude. For 
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Zen, in art and in life, reaching the “Formless Self ” (Hisamatsu’s key word, 
explained below) is a matter of  Awakening, and this takes place in the midst 
of  the most mundane of  circumstances.
For Tillich, a consciousness that is entirely profane is unthinkable. “The-
re is no thing that doesn’t carry religious qualities through its relationship 
to the irrational substance of  Being. Nothing is profane as such” (Tillich, 
2000, p. 407)9. In other words, “there is no consciousness unreligious in 
substance, though it can certainly be so in intention” (Tillich, 1969, p. 139). 
Religiousness inevitably accompanies the human mind’s orientation towards 
the Unconditional,10 even if  expressed in the most secular ways. On the other 
hand, making God into a sacred thing or Being, even the highest one, is real 
atheism, because it makes God into what he is not. 
In his 1961 Bampton lectures, Tillich explicitly and repeatedly refers to 
the convergence between Japan and the West on the issue of  secularization 
(Tillich, 1963, pp. 12, 24-25, 62). Both are highly developed industrial nations 
where the main challenge to the dominant religion comes from secularism 
and quasi-religions (nationalism, communism, liberalism), rather than from 
competing religions. Tillich sees this common challenge as a potential starting 
point for a future dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity. In fact, this 
is also the starting point of  the 1957 encounter. Tillich says that he is able to 
focus amidst the noise and confusion of  his environment by concentrating on 
something (his task), but admits that this is no longer enough for him. To whi-
ch Hisamatsu replies that what Tillich needs is Zen’s objectless concentration.
e) The sTruggle againsT objecTificaTion
Perhaps the most significant point of  convergence is the insight that 
there is no such thing as an objectified, ultimate reality of  any kind. Since 
the very beginning of  his academic career after World War I (1919 and 1920), 
Tillich has led the charge against “objectification,” what he saw as Western 
metaphysics’ mistaken assumption that it is possible to grasp God by identi-
fying him conceptually as the Absolute Being, something Martin Heidegger 
9 “Es gibt kein Ding, das nicht durch seine Beziehung auf  den irrationalen Seinsgehalt religiöse Qualitäten 
in sich tragen würde. Es gibt nichts schlechthin Profanes”.   
10 The German noun das Unbedingte has been translated as either the “Unconditioned” or 
the “Unconditional” by Tillich’s classic translator, James Luther Adams. Tillich used the 
Unconditional in his American period. I have maintained Unconditional when quoting 
translations that use this form and chosen Unconditioned in all other cases. 
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would later refer to as onto-theology. For Tillich, “the Unconditional stands 
beyond both subject and object” (Tillich, 1969, p. 125). Experientially, this 
also means that recovering a faith lost through the onslaught of  secularization 
by rationally demonstrating the existence of  a Being called “God” is absurd. 
It is a self-defeating illusion (Tillich, 2000, pp. 338-339). 
Similarly, at the very beginning of  his first conversation with Tillich, Hi-
samatsu indicates that Zen “means going beyond the subject-object scheme” 
(Hisamatsu and Tillich, 1990, p. 81). Concentration must also be “objectless” 
and “subjectless, i.e., non-dualistic” (Ibid., p. 85-86). The Formless Self, in 
short, transcends both subject and object, just as it transcends all other pairs 
of  dual characteristics. This typical feature appears throughout Hisamatsu’s 
discourse. Thus, Tillich and Hisamatsu share a common understanding that 
the ultimate cannot simply be grasped as a thing11. 
c. resulTs of The encounTer
1) Failure?
It is thus rather surprising to see how difficult it has been for Tillich 
to grasp and digest the paradoxical thought of  Zen when confronted with it 
directly in his three discussions with Hisamatsu. As Newman Robert Glass 
puts it, “the fact that such an accomplished thinker as Tillich seems to come 
off  so poorly in the exchange should be humbling to us all” (Glass, 2004, 
p. 301) 12. In these dialogues, Tillich is clearly in the position of  the learner, 
though a very respected one. Hisamatsu was an invited guest lecturer from 
Japan. He was already well aware of  Tillich’s thought and other Western 
philosophies and theologies. The purpose of  his journey was to disseminate 
knowledge about the yet unknown practice of  Zen, especially Zen art. 
Yet, if  Tillich comes off  poorly in his efforts to grasp the meaning of  
Zen, so does Hisamatsu in his attempt to convey it. His translator De Marti-
11 In his third Bampton Lecture (p. 67), Tillich notes that “the esse ipsum, Being itself, of  the 
classical Christian doctrine of  God, is a transpersonal category and allows the Christian 
disputant to understand the meaning of  absolute nothingness of  Buddhist thought. The 
term points to the unconditional and infinite character of  the Ultimate…”.
12  For a similar critical assessment of  Tillich’s ability to understand Zen, see Joan 
Stambaugh’a The Formless Self, pp. 55-97. Both authors primarily aim at Tillich’s perceived 
difficulties in understanding the paradoxical thought of  Zen from the perspective of  his 
western thinking in terms of  universals and particulars (see below).   
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no13 repeatedly shows considerable frustration over the master’s unwillingness 
to teach Tillich Zen by using the Zen way – that of  direct showing, rather 
than logical reasoning. “For some reason he did not deal with you fully as a 
Zen teacher, which I believe he should have” (Dialogues, p. 169).14 To which 
Fujiyoshi, the Japanese translator, comments: “I don’t think that … would 
have been quite appropriate.” There is a mildly humorous exchange over 
the possibility of  Hisamatsu punching Tillich in the stomach to make his 
point, but things never evolve even remotely in that direction. For whatever 
reason, Hisamatsu feels obliged to maintain his academic courtesy all the 
way to the (dead) end. 
This inability to really penetrate each other’s mental world, in spite of  
a relative flexibility and considerable good will on both sides, can easily re-
sult in some disappointment on the part of  the reader. This is unfortunate 
because, in spite of  the protagonists’ failure to reach mutual understanding, 
the discussion results in a most important achievement: it clearly shows that 
the inevitable disagreement is based on the unique and different identities of  
the two thought systems and their frames of  reference. The lengthy exchange, 
continued over three sessions, with the help of  a Japanese and a Western 
translator, both knowledgeable of  the issues as well as the languages invol-
ved, exposes the demarcation lines between the two thoughts much better 
than any document produced separately by the two authors or by a third 
party. The sometimes chaotic and repetitive nature of  the discussion is more 
than compensated by the fact that neither discussion partner is allowed to 
indulge in wishful thinking. The constant presence of  the other side makes 
it impossible for either of  them to fantasize into existence an imaginary 
solution supposed to be valid from everyone’s perspective.  
This certainly explains why both Tillich and Hisamatsu appear to stress 
the differences between their respective visions more than the common 
points noted above. Both obviously felt the need to clarify the boundaries 
13 Dr. Richard de Martino, from Temple University in Philadelphia, was himself  an accom-
plished scholar who published together with D.T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm and Masao Abe. 
He had also been Tillich’s student. 
14 Earlier on in the third dialogue, De Martino had suggested that Dr. Tillich was “ready for 
more…” (p. 149). He finally concluded that his inadequate translation might be to blame 
for Hisamatsu’s inability or unwillingness to engage Tillich in a “non-verbal manner.” But 
a careful reading of  the transcript does not leave that impression. Hisamatsu’s response 
was deliberate, following an extensive exchange that cannot have left any doubts about 
Tillich’s state of  mind and his expectations. 
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while their counterpart was directly present and able to answer questions. In 
his third Bampton Lecture, Tillich would offer a systematic reflection on the 
relationship between the two approaches, putting much more emphasis on 
the common ground and the potential for cooperation between Buddhism 
and Christianity. Unquestionably, the encounter with Hisamatsu, with all its 
occasional bluntness, provided him with much of  the material for his asses-
sment and therefore deserves to be examined in some detail.
2) Paradox and contradiction
At first, one might have the impression that Tillich, the theologian of  
paradox, has at last met a thought that is too paradoxical even for him to 
comprehend or digest. In fact, the exact opposite is true. It is not Hisamatsu’s 
paradoxical statements that irritate Tillich and leave him perplexed. It is the 
fact that Hisamatsu presents the Zen way as the complete resolution of  the 
paradoxes he so eloquently states. And it is that which prompts Tillich to 
reply: “On this issue … there is apparently a profound difference between 
us. What I would like to comprehend is how his position is even possible (emphasis 
added)” (Dialogues, p. 149)15. It is thus by examining the respective approaches 
to paradox and its solution that progress will be made in understanding the 
positions of  Tillich and Hisamatsu. This, in turn, will lead to an analysis of  
what transcends the pervasive dichotomy of  reality, Tillich’s pure Being and 
Hisamatsu’s Formless Self  respectively.
3) The extent of the solution – and its nature
One leitmotiv in Hisamatsu’s conversations with Tillich and Jung is his 
insistence on the radical, complete nature of  the solution provided by the 
Zen approach. This comes with Hisamatsu’s equally insistent attempts to 
figure out to what extent his discussion partners even claim to find such a 
solution in their own approach. In his 1958 meeting with Carl Gustav Jung, 
Hisamatsu asks “Can psychotherapy liberate us from suffering in one fell 
swoop?” (Jung and Hisamatsu, 2002, p. 115). When he further asks whether 
15  Tillich’s candid cris du coeur stands in contrast to Hisamatsu’s much more self-assured and 
matter-of-fact reply earlier on in the conversation, when dealing with the same topic: “It 
is not that you cannot maintain your position, it is more that we are unable to accept 
your position.” This self-assurance, along with Zen’s appearance on the Western scene in 
the 1960s might explain Tillich’s otherwise surprising characterization of  Buddhism as a 
“most competitive” religion in his 3rd Bampton Lecture (p. 54).
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one can be liberated from the unconscious through psychotherapy, much to 
his surprise Jung answers “Yes!” The editor of  the English version is probably 
right when he assumes that Jung’s answer must have been accompanied with 
some sense of  exasperation not visible in the transcript. He is probably also 
right in assuming that it is that (and not the translation problems between 
Hisamatsu’s Japanese and Jung’s Swiss German dialect) which prompted Jung 
to prevent publication of  the dialogue during his lifetime (Ibid, p. 119, Note 
8). Except for that brief  moment, when he perhaps felt forced to preserve 
the dignity of  his method under the pressure of  questioning, Jung makes 
it abundantly clear that suffering is inevitably part of  life (he quotes Scho-
penhauer) and that psychotherapy’s goal is merely to help people deal with 
it, instead of  escaping into neurosis when facing the inevitable rainy days. 
Jung uses nirdvandva throughout, rather than the more common nirvana 
used by Hisamatsu. The Sanskrit nirdvandva means “freedom from opposites” 
and fits Jung’s outlook much better than nirvana, the complete extinction of  
dualism and opposition. Jung believed that we can learn to manage tensions, 
not obliterate them. And for Tillich, as he states himself  in the dialogues, the 
solution consists of  a dialectical movement towards an infinite horizon (the 
Kingdom of  Heaven) that can never be historically achieved. This exposes 
him to the same challenge as Jung: Hisamatsu questions the adequacy of  
their methods on the ground of  their relative nature. What now follows is 
not an attempt to describe the essence of  Hisamatsu’s philosophy or that 
of  Zen in general, something that is both impossible and unnecessary in the 
present context. It is an effort to show why and how his philosophy and that 
of  Tillich differ in spite of  many convergences, notably from the ontological 
perspective. A section on Tillich’s position will follow.
4) Hisamatsu: radical antinomy and the Formless Self 
a) anTinomy
For Hisamatsu, the predicament of  human life lies in the fact that in every 
aspect of  reality, every single entity is ineluctably accompanied by its opposite. 
The best summation of  his position is found in the following statement:
What I consider to be the ‘ultimate antinomy’ is neither exclusively of  logic 
nor of  will nor of  feeling; it involves all three. It cannot be reduced, there-
fore, either to contradiction, dilemma, or agony; all three are there as one.” 
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De Martino further clarifies: “In Dr. Hisamatsu’s view, human nature is such 
that these several components coalesced as one delineate man’s cardinal con-
tradictory antagonism – or ‘dualistic opposition’ (Dialogues, p. 117).
Antinomy is a term that Hisamatsu explicitly borrows from Kant, for 
whom it however applies strictly to an aporia of  human cognition when 
applied to the realm of  the transcendent. Hisamatsu speaks of  “ultimate 
antinomy” to designate an opposition that reaches across all dimensions of  
life. This dichotomy between the positive and the negative, to use another 
favorite expression of  Hisamatsu, includes the “onto-existential” pair of  
being and non-being, the “axio-logical” pair of  good and evil, the beautiful 
and the unbeautiful in aesthetics, and the true and untrue in cognition.  
For Hisamatsu’s Zen, this conflation of  vastly different forms of  duality 
and opposition, typical of  the influence of  Taoism,16 means that there is no 
aspect of  reality that can be unequivocally grasped by human life or action, 
no safe haven at all where one is free from the counter-effects of  antago-
nism and opposition. Hisamatsu seems to be exclusively concerned with the 
struggles created by the inevitable presence of  an opposing entity for each 
existing entity, e.g., evil opposing good. He does not show any interest for 
a yin-yang type complementarity of  opposites. All attempts to balance out 
the “relative contradictions” of  existence or to solve them while maintaining 
them can only lead to unsatisfactory, partial and temporary solutions in his 
eyes. Hence, the only solution is to go through the Great Doubt of  radical 
questioning of  all aspects of  existence, leading to the Great Awakening of  
the Formless Self. Thus, Hisamatsu jumps from a rejection of  everyday re-
ality that goes well beyond Tillich’s own denial of  its legitimacy to a Great 
Affirmation that goes even further beyond anything that Tillich could accept 
or even fathom – the absolute tranquility of  full detachment, reached in the 
blinking of  an eye.
When Hisamatsu speaks of  what is attained through the Great Awake-
ning that puts an end to our existence of  conflict and pain, his words remain, 
predictably, very paradoxical, since they bring together what words can’t bring 
together. But in that, he is no different from the Zen masters of  the past 
(e.g., Dōgen) or his contemporaries from the Kyoto School. Neither is he 
16  Below, we will see how Tillich challenges the treatment of  good and evil as a pair of  
correlative elements standing on a same footing, as in white vs. black, day vs. night. 
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really any different from the ancient Indian thinker Nagarjuna: “For Nagar-
juna, the insight of  apprehension of  the emptiness of  things is the wisdom 
of  ‘seeing things as they really are,’ namely, in the Suchness or Thusness which 
is beyond all descriptions and distinctions between subject and object, and 
between reality and non-reality (Ryu, 1985, p. 156)”.
What makes Hisamatsu’s statements particularly difficult to comprehend 
for the Cartesian mind is that the transcendence of  every form of  dichotomy 
is not only expressed in a negative way (beyond being and non-being) but 
also in a positive way (being and non-being at the same time). It seems like all 
the oppositions and contradictions that are source of  pain in the everyday 
world find themselves again in the state of  nirvana (samsara sive nirvana), 
only that the contradiction is no longer contradiction and the opposition is 
no longer opposition. Contraries coexist in one point that is beyond space 
and time, beyond existence and non-existence, and so on, the Formless Self. 
This “Formless Self ” is at once one’s own and not one’s own. It is and it is 
not” (Dialogues, p. 92). We are in a realm where none of  the usual laws apply 
and where our intellect is powerless – in fact, obliterated17.
b) The formless self
As explained early on in the first dialogue, the Formless Self 18 is 
Hisamatsu’s own formulation of  what in Zen is more commonly designated 
as “No-Mind” or “No-Consciousness.” Occasionally, he would also call it the 
Calm Self  or the True Self, terms that express its qualities. It immediately 
appears that, in this, Hisamatsu comes down on the side of  affirmation, rather 
than negation in his evaluation of  śūnyatā,19 since the expression “Formless 
Self ” is only negative through the suffix –less, whereas Self  is an affirmation 
17 On this point, the Zen approach is not without similarities with German Idealism and 
Romanticism and their emphasis on the difference between Verstand (understanding) and 
Vernunft (reason), the former referring to the grasping of  reality in the form of  discrete 
entities, never succeeding in grasping the reality of  the whole or its ultimate meaning, 
the latter referring to the wisdom of  true reason, which is capable of  transcending this 
analytical approach. But Zen’s approach is much less intellectual.
18  The original Japanese expression translated as Formless Self  never appears in the publi-
shed version of  the dialogues. It is: 無相の自己(musou no jiko). A more casual form, 
carrying the exact same meaning, is sometimes also used in the literature: 形なき自己 
(katachi na ki jiko). Both expressions correspond quite literally to the English translation 
used by Hisamatsu and his translators.
19  A term he actually does not use.
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not found in “No-Mind” or “No-Consciousness.” The very fact of  choosing 
an expression containing “self ” might be construed as a departure from 
the original Buddhist view, but it also reminds one that “self ” has a vastly 
different meaning in East and West. At the same time, it hints at the pos-
sibility of  a convergence, since Hisamatsu describes the Formless Self  in a 
way that is meant to be faithful to Buddhism and (hopefully) acceptable to 
a Christian thinker like Tillich.
According to Kitaro Nishida, the founder of  the Kyoto school, “for-
mless” is as important in East Asian thought as form or idea in Western 
thought: “In contradiction to Western culture which considers form as exis-
tence and formation as good, the urge to see the form of  the formless, and 
hear the sound of  the soundless, lies at the foundation of  Eastern culture” 
(Nishitani, 1982, p. xxv).
Out of  the formless, every form can arise, therefore it is more important 
that any given form that comes and goes and will always find its opposite. 
At least on the surface, there is a clear similarity to the role of  the apeiron 
(the indeterminate) in the thought of  Anaximander. Contrary to what Tillich 
suggests, the Formless Self  does not “swallow” all forms – it actually gives 
them their real nature: “It is because of  the working of  the Self  without 
form that things with form appear. Form is not threatened by the Formless 
Self; rather it is only because of  the free working of  the Formless Self  that 
there emerge things with form” (Dialogues, p. 89). The Formless Self  is not 
abstract – it is the individual things that we identify as such (glass, table) that 
are abstractions. Things can receive their true identity when apprehended in 
their “Suchness” through the non-discriminating activity of  the Formless Self. 
Formless Self  also clearly expresses that Hisamatsu is not speaking of  
an “emptiness” or “nothingness” that would somehow be the counterpart to 
the theistic concept of  God. The process of  emptying and detachment is an 
eminently existential one20. The Formless Self  that emerges through detach-
ment and satori belongs to another dimension than the one we are used to, 
but obviously this does not mean that it belongs to some distant galaxy, as 
Hisamatsu notes. Nevertheless, he and his translators find themselves imme-
diately at odds with words when trying to describe the “other-dimensional” 
20  Hisamatsu here compares the Zen approach with that of  Meister Eckhart. The exchange 
is inconclusive as to the extent of  the similarity between the two – the typical result of  
any discussion on Western vs. Eastern mysticism.
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reality in non-spatial and non-temporal expressions – by using a language 
that remains inevitably tied to time and space (Dialogues, p. 80 ff.).
c) meTaphysics 
Thus, even though Zen Buddhism is well known for its rejection of  
metaphysics, its starting point is profoundly metaphysical, in that it does 
not seek grounding in our physical or even mental reality. Its grounding is a 
step into the “wholly other” (in this sense, Otto was certainly right). When 
Hisamatsu and representatives of  Zen make statements about that step, even 
descriptive ones, it is hard not to see in them metaphysical assertions (e.g., 
“[The] Formless Self  is at once one’s own and not one’s own. It is and it is 
not”, Dialogues, p. 16-17). And these statements encounter all the difficulties 
of  metaphysical statements, even though they are not meant to logically 
explain anything about that “other” reality. They are still a discourse on that 
reality, a reality that is beyond discourse. The metaphysical dimension of  the 
discourse is confirmed by Hisamatsu’s insistence that what he speaks about 
is neither a new “psychological awareness” nor a mere “state of  mind” (Dia-
logues, p. 79 ff.). It is the Awakening to the Formless Self  in which the seer 
and the seen are one and the same (there is a long discussion on art). The 
Formless Self, which is both one’s own and not one’s own, is what everyone 
should awake to, but unfortunately doesn’t. 
From that perspective, the paradox thus remains a surface phenomenon 
– it is the way the Suchness of  things is expressed in everyday dualistic lan-
guage. Paradoxical statements are dramatic means of  testifying to that state 
of  things. They show that the breakthrough into the reality of  the Formless 
Self  leads into a realm where ordinary language cannot be applied effectively 
and, by their impact on the mind, they suggest what lies below the surface. 
They also give a hint that might lead the listener to eventual Enlightenment 
and real understanding.
5) Tillich: irreducible paradox and dialectic  
a) The naTure of paradox
Tillich’s background is of  course vastly different from Hisamatsu’s. It is 
not that obvious fact, but rather the partial convergence between his views 
and those of  Zen that deserved to be highlighted, which has been done 
above. In the dialogues, direct references to Tillich’s own thought are limited 
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to occasional questions by Hisamatsu, destined essentially to make sure that 
he had understood Tillich properly, and the response is usually affirmative. 
The opposite is not always the case. The main reason for Tillich’s difficulties 
appears to be the fact that his own strong views remain as an insurmountable 
obstacle not only to agreement but, on occasion, to insight as well. 
Since Tillich’s position is not extensively explained in the three dialogues, 
it is necessary to refer to his earlier positions on the key themes involved if  one 
is to have more than a marginal chance to understand the exchange properly. 
Tillich’s position is best summed up in a well-known passage of  his 1922 lecture 
on The Conquest of  the Concept of  Religion. Like Hisamatsu’s statement on the 
universality of  dichotomy quoted above, this passage links the various realms 
of  human life and explains how the notion of  paradox applies to them. But 
the orientation, hence the conclusion, are significantly different.
Tillich explains that a paradox can be either the product of  “artistic 
imagination”, i.e., it is an ingenious, intriguing, or enigmatic formulation 
meant to highlight a key point through “ambiguous and contradictory verbal 
formulation” or it can be of  a logical nature, where “it refers to the tension 
of  two patterns of  thought which are contradictory, though in themselves 
consistent and necessary.” Both are a function of  the subject’s mind and can 
be solved with common sense and logical thinking. 
But, Tillich adds, there is a third type of  paradox: 
… a point where paradox is grounded completely in the object rather than 
in the subject, where paradox is as necessary to every assertion …: the point 
at which the Unconditional becomes an Object. The fact that it becomes an 
object is indeed the primal paradox, since by its nature the Unconditional 
stands beyond the antithesis of  subject and object. Thus, every statement 
about the Unconditional is necessarily in the form of  a paradox. … The 
paradox of  the Unconditional is not resolvable. It poses a problem that calls 
for intuition (Schauen) (Tillich, 1969, pp. 122-123).
Unlike Hisamatsu, Tillich speaks of  paradox, not contradiction. Tillich 
is not disturbed like Hisamatsu by the presence of  non-truth next to truth. 
However, there is one ultimate paradox that can never be solved, because it 
is located in the Unconditioned, the Absolute, or Being (God), that cannot 
be an object (it is beyond subject and object) and yet can only be grasped by 
our mind when it is made into an object of  thought. It is to be noted that 
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the paradox is seen by Tillich as affecting statements about the Unconditioned, 
not the Unconditioned itself. This nevertheless means that for us, paradox 
is inevitably involved in relating to that Unconditioned. 
Thus, the paradoxical statements by Hisamatsu that hint at a total 
dissolution of  the very opposition they state annoy Tillich considerably. He 
does not see their point or their validity and dismisses them as word plays. 
The reasons for Tillich’s fundamental disagreement (though occasionally one 
gets the feeling that he wishes he could agree) can be found in the double 
background of  his spiritual, academic, and personal life. The starting points 
of  Tillich’s Weltanschauung are Christian faith and rational Western philosophy, 
exemplified by the direct influences of  Martin Luther and Immanuel Kant 
respectively. This leads us to at least two elements of  irresolvable paradoxy 
in Tillich’s thought: a philosophical one and a Christian-existential one, both 
closely related. 
b) philosophy of religion
In his early years, Tillich was very much concerned with reconciling the 
“substance” of  religious experience with the contemporary secular worldview. 
The obstacle to that undertaking he saw in the paradoxical relationship be-
tween being and thinking. “Paradoxy means that thinking is forced to affirm 
something [being] that contradicts its own form” (Tillich, 2000, p. 524)21.
In the elaboration of  his critical-intuitive or metalogical method in his early 
years at Berlin University, Tillich brings these two elements together, but sees 
their convergence as an irremediably paradoxical one. Reason can and will 
never reduce Being to its own rules and has to capitulate. Only intuition can 
go further. On the other hand, faith can’t reject as invalid the questions and 
challenges of  reason either. The only solution to this dilemma will be for 
reason to seek an approximation in attempting to account for Being through 
symbols that are as appropriate as possible. Through continuous refinement 
and breaking points, one can thus approach a situation where both faith 
and reason converge, but the actual meeting point will always remain on the 
infinite horizon. 
In his 1920 lecture on the philosophy of  religion, Tillich offers a “pla-
tonic myth” where a stone, by its very existence, challenges thought. Thou-
21  “Paradoxie bedeutet ja, daß das Denken gezwungen ist, etwas zu bejahen, das seiner eigenen Form 
widerspricht.” 
338 Claude Perrottet 
Estudos de Religião, v. 30, n. 3 • 319-348 • set.-dez. 2016 • ISSN Impresso: 0103-801X – Eletrônico: 2176-1078
ght responds to the challenge by declaring the stone a mere object of  its 
thinking activity. But then, says Tillich, thought feels lonely and miserable in 
its victory – it has lost the very thing that it was longing for, being, the thing 
that also irritated it by its presence (Ibid., p. 400). This is a clear reference to 
Otto’s mysterium tremendum and fascinans22. Towards the end of  his 1920 lecture, 
Tillich concludes: “Religion is the function of  consciousness or function of  
the phenomenal world in which thinking experiences its relationship to mere 
being in its double aspect of  terror and bliss (Grauenvolles und Beseligendes) 
(Tillich, 2000, p. 522)”. With this, we leave the realm of  mere philosophy, 
be it philosophy of  religion.
c) Good and evil - sin and guilt 
For Tillich, the mysterium or “mystery” (which has become a common 
code word for God in contemporary theology) faces humans of  all ages and 
all cultures as the supreme reality that is both attractive (offering us what 
cannot be found in this world) and scary, because totally beyond our control 
and source of  judgment. In terms of  Christian theology, this is of  course 
the God of  judgment and grace, sin and salvation.
Tillich’s incredulous response to Hisamatsu’s absolute claim quoted 
above comes with an explanation, and it is not related to cognition or aes-
thetics, but to that precise question of  sin: “Dr. Hisamatsu seems, then, to 
be at a point that has nothing to do with sin or guilt (emphasis added) (Dialogues, 
p. 149).” The total liberation hic et nunc announced by Hisamatsu is not even 
conceivable as a theoretical possibility from Tillich’s Christian perspective23. 
22  In reference to Rudolf  Otto’s numinous, Tillich indicates in 1923 that, besides the “mys-
tery of  depth” (Mysterium des Grundes) there is also the mystery of  light and that both are 
equally unconditioned and irreducible to one another. Both are equally legitimate (Tillich, 
1923, p. 185). 
23  Again, for Tillich, the paradox is not a starting point that can be overcome – it is the 
core of  reality. Christianity, the religion of  the cross with the Savior who denies his own 
affirmation to the point of  death is the highest religion because it most fully accounts 
for the paradoxical nature of  reality. It is the religion of  paradox, as expressed in the 
Bible’s own paradoxical passages, such as “the first will be the last” and “those who want 
to lose their life will save it and those who want to save their life will lose it.” In a June 
7, 1960 encounter with Japanese Christians, Tillich explicitly, even bluntly indicates that, 
on this point, Zen runs the considerable danger of  elevating the self  above its natural 
limitations, as a form of  self-aggrandizement – a comment that is made in reference to 
another discussion with Hisamatsu. Tillich also makes the comparison with the danger 
of  demonic hybris in Catholic monasticism (Wood, 1961, p. 59).  
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Tillich’s wife Hannah, who participated in the three encounters with Hi-
samatsu, offers this description of  Tillich by a Japanese Zen master: “Not 
one of  the enlightened yet,” because “he still made the distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘evil’” (Tillich H., 1973, p.24). One need not take Hannah Tillich’s 
description entirely at face value to find it largely credible.
Interestingly, when Hisamatsu makes the statement that, from the Zen 
perspective, the awakened one should be able to say “I am the ultimate,” his 
main translator, De Martino, agrees with Tillich that he too would be shy 
to make such a statement “as of  this moment” (Dialogues, p. 159). Apparen-
tly, De Martino’s theistic background stands in his way. Hisamatsu, on the 
contrary, insists that Buddha-hood or Christ-nature should not be limited 
to one special, divine individual and that all humans have the potential to 
become the ultimate beyond any notion of  good and evil: “Non-dualistic 
ultimacy does not – and should not – make one hesitant to proclaim that one 
is oneself  ‘ultimate.’ The sort of  ultimacy that might cause such a reluctance 
most likely involves the judgment of  good and evil (Ibid.)”.
But, for both, the question of  evil or sin and the way to overcome it 
are related to the notion of  a fall into finitude, which makes Tillich’s position 
unorthodox from a Christian perspective. Essential is the fact that, for Tillich, 
sin and evil involve the notion, and even more the experience, of  judgment 
by a “wholly other” ultimate that is more than just a new dimension of  one’s 
self. This all leads us quite naturally to the underlying issue of  the entire dis-
cussion: is there anything comparable in the ultimate in Christian theism, even 
Tillich’s unconventional one, and the Zen notion of  the ultimate as Formless 
Self ? Is Tillich’s optimistic assessment that Buddhism’s notion of  emptiness 
is a non-hypostasized equivalent of  God, or pure Gehalt, warranted? If  the 
question of  evil, hence judgment by an Ultimate, makes it doubtful, so does 
the question of  the particular, through which the individual participates in 
that Ultimate, or incarnates it.  
d) The issue of The parTicular
Out of  all the questions discussed during the three-part dialogue betwe-
en Tillich and Hisamatsu, it is the apparently technical issue of  the particular 
that forms the surprising culminating point and links all other points to the 
question of  the Ultimate’s nature. After repeated, unfruitful attempts to re-
ach a conclusion, the question comes up a last time in the third dialogue, at 
which point Tillich has a memorable cris du coeur. He expresses his inability 
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to comprehend, much less agree: “Dr. Hisamatsu seems, then, to be at a 
point that has nothing to do with sin or guilt. On this issue of  the particular 
there is apparently a profound difference between us. What I would like to 
comprehend is how his position is even possible (Dialogues, p. 149)”.
The problem arises when Hisamatsu speaks of  the transition from the 
world of  everyday reality, where each particular individual finds itself  in 
opposition of  some sort with other items, to the world of  Enlightenment, 
where there is no such opposition. We need to remember that, for Hisamat-
su, it is the concept of  being that necessarily implies non-being (Dialogues, p. 
116).” It is the analytical approach that, so to speak, creates dual opposition 
where there is none. For Tillich, the disappearance of  the duality implies the 
disappearance of  the particular self, which Hisamatsu strenuously denies – to 
no avail. When Tillich objects that, transcendent and timeless as it may be, 
Enlightenment happens at a moment in time and space, and that it happens 
to a particular individual, e.g., Hisamatsu, and not to Hitler or a shoemaker, 
De Martino’s predictable response is that “considered from the perspective 
of  time-and-space, the Awakening may seem to take place in time-and-space. 
But considered from the perspective of  the Awakening-in-itself, it is neither 
conditioned nor restricted by either time or space” (Dialogues, p. 126). To 
which Tillich responds: “Then it cannot happen to a human being.”
i. The universal and The parTicular
Tillich, who is used to think in terms of  universals and particulars, sees 
this as the disappearance of  the particular, “swallowed” by the Formless Self. 
In his third Bampton lecture, held a few years later, Tillich ends along the 
same lines:  “Only if  each person has a substance of  his own is community 
possible, for community presupposes separation. You, Buddhist friends, have 
identity, but not community (Tillich, 1963, p. 75).” Whether Tillich is right 
in this evaluation or not, it is certainly on this point that he has the greatest 
difficulties grasping Hisamatsu’s thought. When Hisamatsu indicates that, for 
the Formless Self, the flower and the one who sees the flower are one and 
the same, Tillich dismisses the statement as a paradoxical “way of  speaking.” 
From his comment in the Bampton lectures, as few years later, it appears 
that he came to take the Zen position more seriously, while still seeing it as 
problematic. That position will now be examined.
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ii. non-obsTrucTion beTWeen parTicular and parTicular
Hisamatsu explains that, far from removing the identity of  the particu-
lar, the Awakening to the Formless Self  gives particulars their true reality: 
“Ordinary individuals are unfulfilled, isolated, or disintegrated, and cannot 
be regarded as ‘authentic individuals.’ Authentic individuals as understood 
in Zen Buddhism may be explained in the … concept of  jiji-muge [事事無
礙] (the non-obstruction between particular and particular) … or koko-enjo 
[箇箇円成] (each individual fulfilled)” (Dialogues, p. 143). “Non-obstruction 
between particular and particular” means that, for the Formless Self, things 
are immediately apprehended in their “Suchness” (as what they are), and not 
through the medium of  conceptualization that inevitably makes distinctions 
and separates. By dropping the analytic-dualistic approach, one does not 
deny the individuality of  the particular, rather one affirms it, but with the 
immediacy of  the experience of  oneness or identity between the particulars. 
“Non-obstruction” is a good reminder of  the nothingness or emptiness 
found in the Formless Self, in spite of  its repeatedly emphasized affirmative 
nature of  that Self. Precisely speaking, it shows the affirmative or positive 
nature of  that very emptiness, in that emptiness allows for full freedom – it 
does not stand in the way, hence, “non obstruction.” But it is not a physical 
emptiness, one that would merely allow for something to be put somewhere, 
like an empty room that is free for new furniture. It is an emptiness of  the 
Self  that is no longer obstructed by dualistic thinking and ordinary percep-
tion. That emptiness allows the already existing reality to be its true Self. 
In it, the Self  is unfettered and gains genuine access to things as they are.
Something is grasped about reality that the Western tradition has a 
hard time to process, because that tradition is very much entrenched in the 
rational-analytical dualistic way of  thinking. Nishitani observes:
Kant looks on things from the very outset as objects; or, to put it the other way 
around, his standpoint is that of  representation. In this theoretical philosophy, 
an objective, representational point of  view is presupposed as a constant base. 
The problem of  the thing-in-itself  developed, in fact, from the presupposition 
of  such a base (Nishitani, 1982, p.133).
Needless to say, the observation is not only aimed at Kant – after all he 
tried to solve the problem – but also at those who preceded and followed 
him. With the development of  his critical-intuitive or metalogical method, 
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Tillich makes a particularly ambitious attempt to overcome this very problem 
without sacrificing either rational thinking or the immediacy of  experience. 
He also offers an explicit critique of  Kant (notably in the first ten hours of  
his 1920 course in Berlin), in spite of  his great appreciation for the Kantian 
revolution, and his words sound strangely familiar to the reader of  Nishitani. 
But his criticism also reveals the whole difference between his outlook 
and that of  Zen. Tillich criticizes Kant for his use of  the thing-in-itself, 
saying that with it Kant reintroduces an objectification of  the Ultimate. Even 
though Kant insists that nothing can be said about the thing-in-itself, the very 
fact of  introducing this terminology implies a wholly rational starting point 
– on this, Tillich and Nishitani would agree24.  However, Tillich’s critique 
is aimed at Kant’s mode of  approaching the question of  the unconditioned 
element that must be “behind” phenomena. Tillich, far from denying that 
unconditional element, makes it his early code word for God, das Unbedingte, 
borrowed straight from Kant. Tillich’s challenge to Kant is that the Uncon-
ditioned can only be grasped when the critical function of  the mind is com-
bined with intuition. The issue thus is the relationship to the Unconditioned.
For Zen, and this is Nishitani’s entire point, the question of  the thing-
-in-itself  does not even arise, because, to the awakened one, there is no 
thing (object) vs. self  (subject), as both are experienced as immediately one. 
D. Final Assessment
1. The onTological boTTom line
Communion and identity: The conclusion of  the discussion on the ultima-
te is thus not unexpected. On one side, there is the challenge of  communion 
(between the Ultimate and the self, and among selves); on the other side that 
of  identity (between the Ultimate or Formless Self  and each self). For Tillich, 
the Ultimate inevitably takes the place of  object in the cognitive process, 
though it is beyond subject and object. The Western quest for an intellectual 
grasp of  the Ultimate is destined to fail because of  this fundamental paradox. 
24  In his 1920 Lecture (p. 507), Tillich states that even the high point of  European mysticism 
(Plotinus) remains too much linked to form. The West, he says “makes a system even 
out of  mysticism.” This is not the case in India, where the Gehalt is grasped as what is 
essential to the point that form no longer plays a role. Western mysticism is “the result 
of  a rational history of  philosophy. The mystical principle is the last abstraction of  the 
knowledge of  the world going beyond itself.”
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However, the Ultimate remains the Ultimate – infinite and unconditioned 
– and distinct from the finite self. A non-objectified, non-existing God is, 
therefore, nevertheless an absolute God for Tillich. To have a paradoxical 
relationship, you need a relationship, and to have a relationship, you need 
two: the Ultimate and the Self. Tillich rejects Buddhism’s “a = non-a” just 
as he rejects Hegel’s panlogic equivalent of  “being = non-being”.
In one word, Tillich stands squarely within the Western tradition made 
of  an uneasy but tremendously successful blend between Judeo-Christian 
theism and dualistic Greek philosophy. In 1920, Tillich compares the state-
ment that a = a with the statement that a = b. The first, for him, amounts 
to certain but dead identity. The second is less safe and less certain, but it 
means development and life. The highest mystical speculation, he says, always 
reaches a = a, but as soon as this happens, “all life is destroyed” (ist alles Leben 
vernichtet; Tillich, 2000, pp. 394-395). Tillich reemphasizes this point in his 
encounter with Hisamatsu (Dialogues, p. 115-116) when he states that “pure 
being would be death.” How the lifeless a = a leads to a = b is beyond the 
grasp of  reason, it is the mystery of  creation. 
Next, even though Tillich makes the unusual step to accept that 
there is potential evil even in the Ultimate, God, for him that evil is only 
potential. Tillich’s position here is very untraditional for a Christian the-
ologian and comes as a great surprise to Hisamatsu. In the end, though, 
it remains unacceptable for him, because Tillich insists on the potential 
nature of  that evil in God (whose choice is not to actualize it) and because 
he stresses that evil is a derivative distortion of  goodness, rather than its 
inevitable counterpart (Dialogues, p. 116 ff.). The mere existence of  evil 
and untruth next to goodness and truth does not have the same devas-
tating consequences for Tillich as it does for Zen. God remains as a safe 
haven of  absolute goodness and absolute truth, even though the process 
of  becoming one with that Ultimate can never be completed in this finite 
world (Tillich speaks of  anticipation, an expression that of  course elicits a 
negative response from Hisamatsu). 
Ground of  Being: If  Tillich makes it clear that a particular Self  claiming 
ultimacy – and not just participation in the ultimate – is unacceptable, 
Hisamatsu makes it equally clear that the notion of  a ground of  being, or 
whatever other expression is used to replace the classic notion of  causal 
Being or Creator, is unacceptable to his Zen philosophy, because it leads 
back to dualism.
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Hisamatsu introduces Eckhart’s notions of  Abgeschiedenheit (which Tilli-
ch translates as separateness) and links it to the Zen notion of  detachment. 
He also brings up Eckhart’s expression of  Urgrund (ultimate ground)25 and 
“divine abyss” (Abgrund) that Tillich likes to borrow from the medieval 
mystics and from Schelling (Dialogues, p. 83 ff). But he stresses that if  
Urgrund means a divine abyss (Abgrund) from which all things with a finite 
form emerge, that still leaves duality. For Zen, the Urgrund should be the 
Self. Thus, even the most Zen-like Christian mystic is suspected to diverge 
from Zen on the most essential point of  all26. The ultimacy of  the Formless 
Self  is so essential to Hisamatsu, because with it all potential for tension 
and paradox disappears for good.
The wholly other: neither tremendum nor fascinans – or even mysterious: If  we now 
turn to Otto’s contention (shared by Tillich) that the non-being of  Buddhism 
is a mere formulation of  the “wholly other” and thus corresponds to being 
on an experiential level, the limits of  that astute observation appear at once. 
In Zen, nothingness may indeed transcend both regular being and non-being 
and amount to a Great Affirmation, but it is one that is neither tremendum nor 
fascinans nor even a mysterium – quite the contrary. The Enlightenment of  śūnyatā 
removes any sense of  mystery, since it means direct contact with the Self. It 
removes the fear and insecurity created by dual opposition, and it leaves no 
room for desire or fascination. Nothing perhaps better shows how the basic 
attitudes of  Buddhism and theism hint at a very different experience of  Gehalt. 
What that Gehalt actually is lies beyond our considerations.
Art: This quiet, but pervasive ontological difference underlying the whole 
exchange between Tillich and Hisamatsu even appears in the discussion on 
art. Both use the term expressionism to describe what they consider the highest 
form of  art. Tillich has in mind early 20th century German expressionism and 
its often brutal expression of  the struggle of  life (he also mention’s Picasso’s 
25  Though “ultimate ground” is probably the best possible translation, it does not do full 
justice to the emotional weight of  any German expression starting with “Ur-”, signifying 
something deeply original and ancient – as far back as one can go, but not just in a spatio-
-temporal sense. Kant uses Grund, the grounding of  things, as opposed to their cause, to 
avoid contradicting his own conclusion that nothing can be known of  causes as they are 
in themselves.
26  Nishitani’s evaluation of  Eckhart is much more positive and makes him practically into 
an adept of  Zen. Not only the Self, but also God reaches absolute nothingness before 
being reborn together in the soul of  man (like Tillich, Nishitani refers to Eckhart’s “God 
beyond God”). The soul in not in communion or union with God, it is one with him. 
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Guernica, which Hisamatsu particularly dislikes for its “noisy” nature). By ex-
pressionism, Hisamatsu means Zen art and its capacity to evoke detachment 
and profound quietude. Even Paul Klee’s painting of  a fish surrounded by 
semi-abstract motives only elicits partial approval from Hisamatsu who still 
finds the dark setting of  the painting scary. Zen art does make use of  dark-
ness, but it is a quiet, peaceful darkness, not a threatening one27. 
2) Mutual attraction: Zen’s longing for the West and Tillich’s 
nostalgia for Far Eastern peace
Kant is famous for reducing the entire philosophical undertaking to 
three questions: what is, what should be, and what one can hope for. After 
discussing the first two from the respective perspectives of  Tillich and Zen, 
it might be good to give a thought to the third question.
Hisamatsu well represents a longing that is common to much of  con-
temporary Japanese philosophy, notably his colleagues of  the Kyoto School. 
This particular longing is not an existential one. It is a fascination with the 
success of  Western philosophy, especially 19th century dialectic and 20th 
century existentialism, in formulating the existential distress of  modern life. 
In spite of  their critical evaluation of  that Western thought, thinkers like 
Kitaro Nishida, Keiji Nishitani, Daisetz Suzuki, and Shin’ichi Hisamatsu 
were not only desirous to spread the practice of  Zen beyond the shores of  
Japan. They were also attracted by the West. They had been intellectually 
trained in Western thought, particularly German philosophy (Nishitani, for 
instance, has been a student of  Heidegger). Therefore, in their writings, one 
can easily detect an effort to use the Hegelian and existentialist “newspeak” 
in formulating their own religious philosophy.  
We find a case in point in Masao Abe’s attempt to show the dialectical 
character of  śūnyatā: 
This dialectical structure of  Sunyata may be logically explained as follows: 
since Sunyata is realized not only by negating the ‘eternalist’ view but also 
by negating the ‘nihilistic’ view, which negates the former, it is not based on 
a mere negation but on the negation of  negation. This double negation is 
27  The German language, interestingly, uses Dunkelheit to express a positive, peaceful da-
rkness, and Finsternis to express a scary type of  darkness, a distinction that comes very 
close to that between the two types of  darkness introduced by Hisamatsu.
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not a relative negation but an absolute negation. And an absolute negation is 
nothing but an absolute affirmation. Thus we may say that absolute negation 
is absolute affirmation and absolute affirmation is absolute negation. This 
paradoxical statement well expresses the dialectical and dynamic structure 
of  Sunyata in which emptiness is fullness and fullness is emptiness (Ryu, 
1985, p. 162).
This obvious reference to the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic and the effort 
to squeeze Zen into its parameters is a good example of  what was just said. 
But though it offers an interesting new perspective, it will nevertheless leave 
many readers unsatisfied28. Given the very self-understanding of  Zen, some 
would probably consider the attempted synthesis to be against nature.
Tillich’s own interest in Zen is fairly easy to explain. Though Tillich’s 
nature and orientation are far remote from the dispassionate stance of  Bu-
ddhism and more particularly Zen, it is no surprise that this religious tradition 
captured his attention. First, even though Buddhism plays a modest role in 
Tillich’s early philosophy of  religion, what he says about it is revealing of  a 
profound fascination because Buddhism makes it its central aim to avoid any 
objectification of  the divine. In Buddhism, says Tillich, “forms are there in 
order to be overcome (“… die gesamte Welt der Formen dazu da ist, überwundern 
zu werden”; Tillich, 2000, p. 556).” That makes Buddhism an objective ally 
of  Tillich’s philosophy of  religion. But, more than that, Buddhism promises 
what has eluded Tillich throughout his life, internal peace. The very beginning 
of  the three dialogues consists of  an exchange where Tillich expresses his 
sense of  a need for what amounts to Zen’s objectless concentration, because 
the faculty to focus his mind on a specific goal in the midst of  modern-day 
brouhaha, useful as it is, no longer satisfies him on a deeper level. 
Tillich was a passionate man and, as such, he suffered the pain of  his 
passions. The wish to find the peace that accompanies the dispassionate 
stance of  Zen – without abandoning his passion altogether – finally led 
him to ask the somewhat puzzling question: what about being freely attached? 
(Dialogues, p. 136). Hisamatsu’s reply is of  course that freedom comes with 
28  In the Hegelian dialectic, the affirmation is negated, after which the negation itself  is 
negated. This negation of  the negation amounts to an affirmation and leads to a dynamic 
movement through becoming. In Zen, both being and non-being are negated at the same 
time from a perspective that has nothing to do with either. Explaining the affirmative nature 
of  nothingness by saying that it is negation of  negation therefore seems far-fetched at best. 
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detachment and is incompatible with attachment. But Tillich’s question was 
more than a bon mot or a sign of  naivety.  It clearly was a wish. The fact that 
both sides, in spite of  their strong positions, felt themselves drawn to each 
other in such a way is a sign more powerful than any ontological analysis that 
an interface was (and still is) waiting to be explored for mutual enrichment.
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